One a nomaly is calle d the equ ity premiu m . Sto cks--or equ ities --tend t o ha ve more varia ble annual price changes (or returns ) than bonds do. As a result, the average return to stocks is higher, as a way o f compens ating inve sto rs fo r the ad ditional risk the y bear . In most o f this century, for example, stock returns were about 8% per year higher than bond returns. This was accepted as a reasonable return premium for equities until Mehra and Prescott (1985) asked how large a degree of risk-aversion is implied by this premium. The answer is surprising--under the standard assumptions of economic theory, investors must be extremely risk-averse to demand such a high premium. For example, a per son with enough risk-aversion t o explain the equity premium would be indifferent between a coin flip paying either $50,000 or $100,000, and a sure amount of $51,329. Explaining why the equity pr emium is so high has pr eoccupied financial eco nomists for the last fifteen years ( see Sieg el and Thaler, 199 7) . Bena rtzi and Thaler ( 199 7) s ugg est ed a plausible answer based on prospect theory. In their theory, investors are not averse to the variability of returns, they are averse to lo ss (the chance t hat retur ns are negative) . Since annual sto ck ret urns are nega tive much mo re fr equ ent ly than annu al bond returns are, lo ss-aver se invest ors will demand a large equity premium to compensate them for the much higher chance of losing money in a year. Keep in mind that the higher average return to stocks means that the cumulative return to stocks over a longer horizon is increasingly likely to be positive as the horizon lengthens. Therefore, to explain the equity premium Benartzi and Thaler must assume that investors take a short horizo n, over which stocks are mor e likely to lose money than bonds. They compu te the expected prospect values of stock and bond returns over various horizons, using estimates of investor utility functions from Kahneman and Tversky (1992) , and including a loss-aversion coefficient of 2.25 (i.e., the disutility of a small loss is 2.25 times as large as the utility of an equal gain). Benart zi and Thaler show t hat over a one-year ho rizon, the pr ospect values of stock and bond returns are about the same if stocks return 8% more than bonds, which explains the equity premium.
2. Finance: The disposition effect Shefrin and Statman (1985) predicted that because people dislike incurring losses much more than they like incurring gains, and are willing to gamble in the domain of losses, investors will hold on to stocks that have lost value (relative to their purchase price) to o long and will be eager to sell stocks that have r isen in value. They called this t he disposition effect . The disposition effect is anomalous because the purchase price of a stock should not matter much for whet her you decided to sell it . If you think the st ock will r ise, you should k eep it; if yo u think it will fall, you should sell it. In addition, tax laws encourage people to sell losers rather than winners, since such sales generate losses which can be used to reduce the taxes owed on capital gains.
Disposition effects have been found in experiments by (Weber and Camerer, 1998) 2 . On losers more t han winners. This shows they are not opt imistic about the losers, but simply reluct ant to sell them and lock in a realized loss.
large exchanges, trading volume of stocks that have fallen in price is lower than for stocks that have risen. T he best field study was do ne by Odean (in p ress). He o bta ined d ata fro m a brokerage firm about all the purchases and sales of a large sample of individual investors. He found that investors held losing stocks a median of 124 days, and held winners only 104 days. Investors sometimes say they hold losers because t hey expect them to bounce back (or meanrevert ) but in O dean s samp le, t he unsold lose rs r eturned o nly 5% in the subseq uent year, while the winners t hat wer e so ld lat er r eturned 1 1.6 %. Int ere stingly, t he winner-loser differ ence s did disappear in December. In this month investors have their last chance to incur a tax advantage from selling losers (and selling winners generates a taxable capital gain) so their reluctance to incur losses is temporarily overwhelmed by their last chance to save on taxes.
3. Labor supply Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein and Thaler (this volume) talked to cab drivers in New York City about when they decide to quit driving each day. Most of the drivers lease their cabs, for a fixed fee, for up t o 12 ho urs . Ma ny said the y set an income t arg et for the day, and q uit when they reach that target. While daily income targeting seems sensible, it implies that drivers will work long hours on bad days when the per-hour wage is low, and will quit earlier on good high-wage days. T he st anda rd t heo ry of the supply of labor pr edicts t he o ppo site : Dr ivers will work t he ho urs which are most pro fitable, quit ting ear ly on ba d da y, and making up the shortfall by working longer on good days.
The daily targeting theory and the standard theory of labor supply therefore predict oppo site signs o f the co rrelat ion between hours and t he daily wage. To measure t he correlatio n, we collected t hree samples of dat a on how many hours drivers w orked on different days. The correlation between hours and wages was strongly negative for inexperienced drivers and close to zer o fo r exper ience d dr ivers. T his sugge sts tha t inexper ience d dr ivers beg an us ing a d aily inco me tar get ing heurist ic, but t hose who did so eithe r tended to quit , or lear ned by exper ience t o shift to war d dr iving aro und the same numbe r o f hours every d ay.
Daily income targeting assumes loss-aversion in an indirect way. To explain why the correlation between hours and wages for inexperienced drivers is so strongly negative, one needs to assu me that drivers take a one -da y hor izon, and have a utilit y funct ion fo r the da y s inco me which bends sharply at t he daily income target . This bend is an aversio n to losing by falling short of an income reference point.
Asymmetric price elasticities of consumer goods
The price elasticity of a good is the change in quantity demanded, in percentage terms, divided by the percent age change in its price. Hund reds o f studies estimate elasticit ies by looking at how much purchases change after prices change. Loss-averse consumers dislike price increases more than they like the windfall gain from price cuts, and will cut back purchases more when prices rise, compared to the extra amount they buy when prices fall. Loss-aversion therefore implies elasticities will be asymmetric--elasticities will be larger in magnitude after price increases tha n aft er p rice decrea ses. Put ler ( 199 2) lo oked fo r su ch an asymmet ry in price elasticities in consumer purchases of eggs, and found it.
Hardie, Johnso n, and Fader (1993) replicat ed the study using a typical model of brand choice in which a consumer s utility for a brand is unobserved, but can be estimated by obser ving purchases. They included the possibility that consumers compare a good s current price to a reference price (the last price they paid) and get mor e disutility from buying when prices have risen than the extra utility they get when prices have fallen. For orange juice, they estimate a coefficient of loss-aversion around 2.4.
Note tha t fo r loss-aver sion to expla in these results, c onsumer s must be narrowly bracketing purchases of a specific good (egg s, or orang e juice). Other wise, the loss fro m paying more for one g ood would be integrated with gains o r losses from other goods in their shopping cart, and would not loom so large.
Savings and consumption: Insensitivity to bad news
In economic models of lifetime savings and consumption decisions, people are assumed to have separate utilities for consumption in each period, denoted u(c(t)), and discount factors which weight future consumption less than current consumption. These models are used to predict how much rat ional consumers will consume (or spend) now and how much they will save, depending on t heir cur rent income, ant icipatio ns of future income, a nd t heir discount fa ctors. T he models make many predictions which seem to be false. The central prediction is that people should plan ahead by ant icipating fut ure inco me to make a guess about their permanent income , and consume a const ant fraction o f that tot al in any one year. Since most workers earn larger and larger incomes throughout their lives, this prediction implies that people will spend more than they earn when they are young--borrowing if they can--and will earn more than they spend when they are older. But in fact , spending on consumption tends to be close t o a fixed fraction o f current income, and does not vary across the life cycle nearly as much as standard theory predicts. Consumption also drops steeply after retirement, which it should not if people anticipate retirement and save enough for it. Shea (1995) point ed o ut a not her p redictio n of t he st andard life-cycle t heory. T hink of a group of workers whose wages for the next year are set in advance--in Shea s empirical analysis, the se a re u nion ized teachers who se c ont rac t is negot iated o ne year a head. In t he standard the or y, if next year s wage is surprisingly good, then the teachers sho uld spend more no w, and if next year s wage is disappointingly low, the teachers should cut back on their spending now. In fact, the teachers in Shea s study did spend more when their future wages were expected to rise, but the y did not cut back when their future wages were cut. Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (BMR, 1997) can explain this pattern with a stylized twoperiod consumption-savings model in which workers have reference-dependent utility, u(c(t)-r(t)). The utility they get from consumption in each period exhibits loss-aversion (the marginal utility of consuming just enough to reach the reference point is always strictly larger than the marginal utility from exceeding it) and a reflection effect (if people are consuming below their reference point, the marg inal ut ility of consump tio n rise s as t hey ge t close r to it ). Wor ker s beg in with some reference point r(t ), and save and consume in the first period. Their reference point in the second period is an average of their initial reference point and their first-period consumption, so r(2)= ±r(1)+(1-±)c(1). The pleasure workers get from consuming in the second period depends on how much t hey consumed in the first period, through the effect of previous consumption o n the current reference point. If they consumed a lot at first, they will be disappointed if their standard of living is cut.
BMR s how formally how this simple mod el can explain the behavio r of the teache rs in Shea s study. Suppose teachers are consuming at their reference point, and they get bad news about future wages (in the sense that the distribution of possible wages next year shifts downward). BMR show that the teachers may not cut their current consumption at all. Consumption is sticky do wnward for two reasons: First, because they are loss-averse, cut ting cur rent consumpt ion means t hey will consume be low the ir re fere nce p oint this year, which fee ls awful. Second, because of reflection effects, they are willing to gamble that next year s wages might not turn out so bad--they would rather take a gamble in which they either consume far below their refe rence point or consume right at it , t han accept consump tio n which is modestly below the reference po int. These two forces make t he teachers reluctant to cut their cu rrent consumption after receiving bad news about future income prospects, explaining Shea s finding.
6. Status quo bias, endowment effects, and buying-selling price gaps Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) coined the term status quo bias to refer to an exaggerated preference for the stat us quo, and showed such a bias in a series of experiments. They also reported several observations in field data which are consistent with status quo bias.
When Harvard University added new health-car e plan options, older faculty members who were hired previously, when the new options were not available were, of course, allowed to swit ch t o t he new options. If one assu mes t hat the new a nd o ld faculty member s have essent ially the same pre fere nces for healt h car e plans, the n the distribut ion o f plans elected by new and old faculty should be the same. However, Samuelson and Zeckhauser found that older faculty members tended to stick to their previous plans; compared to the newer faculty members, fewer of the old faculty elected new options.
In cases where there is no status quo, people may have an exaggerated preference for whichever option is the default choice. Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther (1993) obs erv ed t his pheno meno n in de cisio ns involving ins urance pu rch ase s. At t he t ime of their study, Pennsylvania and New Jersey legislators were considering various kinds o f tort reform, allowing firms to offer cheaper automobile insurance which limited the rights of the insured person to sue for damages from accidents. Both states adopted very similar forms of limited insurance, but they chose different default options, creating a natural experiment. All insurance companies mailed forms to their customers, asking the customers whether they wanted the cheaper limited-rights insurance or t he unlimited-rights insurance. One state made the limited-rights insurance t he default--the insured person would get that if they did not respond--and the other made unlimited-rights the default. In fact, the percentage of people electing the limited-rights insurance was higher in the state where that was the default. An experiment replicated the effect.
A closely relat ed body of research on endowment effects established t hat buying and selling prices for a good are often quite different. The paradigmatic experimental demonstration of this is the mugs experiments of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) . In their experiments, some subjects are endowed (randomly) with coffee mugs and others are not. Those who are given the mugs demand a price about 2-3 times as large as the price that those without mugs are willing to pay, even though in economic theory these prices should be extremely close together. In fact, the mugs experiments were inspired by field observations of large gaps in hypothetical buying and selling prices in contingent valuations . Contingent valuations are measurements of the economic value of goods which are not normally traded--like clean air, environmental damage, and so forth. These money valuat ions are used for doing benefit-cost analysis and establishing economic damages in lawsuits. There is a huge literatur e establishing that selling prices are generally much larger than buying pr ices, although t here is a heated debate among psychologists and economists about what the price gap means, and how to measure true valuations in the face of such a gap.
All three phenomena--status quo biases, default preference, and endowment effects--are consistent with aversion to losses relative to a reference point. Making one option the status quo or default, or endowing a person with a good (even hypothetically), seems to establish a reference point p eople mo ve aw ay fro m only r eluctantly, or if the y are paid a lar ge sum.
Racetrack betting: The favorite-longshot bias
In parimutuel betting on horse races, there is a pronounced bias toward betting on longshots , horses with a relatively small chance of winning. That is, if one groups longshots with the same percentage of money bet on them into a class, the fraction of time horses in that class win is far smaller than the percentage of money bet on them. Horses with 2% of the total money bet on them, for example, win only about 1% of the time (see Thaler and Ziemba, 1988; Hausch and Ziemba, 1995) .
The fact that longshots are overbet implies favorites are underbet. Indeed, some horses are so heavily favored t hat up to 7 0% of the win money is wagered on them. For t hese heavy favorites, the return for a dollar bet is very low if the horse wins. (Since the track keeps about 15% of the money bet for expenses and profit, bettors who bet on such a heavy favorite share only 85% of the money with 70% of the people, a payoff of only about $2.40 for a $2 bet.) People dislike these bets so much that in fact, if you make those bets you can earn a small positive profit (even accounting for the track s 15% take).
There a re ma ny explanat ions for the favo rite-lo ngshot bias, each of w hich probably contributes to t he phenomenon. Horses that have lost many races in a row tend to be longshots, so a gambler s fallacy belief that such horses are due for a win may contribute to overbetting on them. Prospect-theoretic overweighting of low probabilities of winning will also lead to overbetting of longshots.
Within standard expected utility theory, the favorite-longshot bias can only be explained by assuming that people have convex utility functions for money outcomes. The most careful study comparing expected utility and prospect theory was done by Jullien and Salanié (1997) . Their study used a huge sample of all the flat races run in England for ten years (34,443 races). They assume t hat bet tor s value bet s on horses using either expect ed utility theory, rank-dependent utility theory, or cumulative prospect theory (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1992) . If the marginal bettor is indifferent among bets on all the horses at the odds established when the race is run, then indifference conditions can be used to infer the parameters of that bettor s utility and probability weighting functions.
Jullien and Salanié find that cumulative prospect theory fits much better than rankdep ende nt t heo ry and expe cted u tilit y theory. They estimat e that the utility function fo r small money amount s is convex. Their est imate of t he pro bability weighting function À (p) for pro babilit ies o f gain is almos t linear, but the weighting function fo r loss probabilit ies se verely overweights low probabilities of loss (e.g., À(.1)=.45 and À(.3)=.65) . These es tima tes imply a surprising new explanation for the favorite-longshot bias: Bettors like longshots because they have convex u tilit y and w eight the ir high chances of lo sing a nd sma ll chances of winning r oughly linearly. But they hate favorites because they like to gamble (u(x) is convex), but are disproportionately afraid of the small chance of lo sing w hen t hey bet o n a heavy favorite. (In my per sonal exp erie nce a s a be tt ing resear cher I ve fo und tha t lo sing o n a heavy favorite is particularly disappointing, an emotional effect the Jullien-Salanié estimates seem to capture.) 8. Racetrack betting: The end-of-the-day effect McGlothlin (1956) and Ali (1977) established another racetrack anomaly which points to the central role of reference points. They found that bettors tend to shift their bets toward longshots, and away from favorites, later in the racing day. Because the track takes a hefty bite out of each dollar, most bettors are behind by the last race of the day. These bettors really prefer longshots because a small longshot bet can generate a large enough profit to cover their earlier losses, enabling them to break even. The movement toward longshots, and away from favorites, is so pronounced that some studies show that betting on the favorite to show (to finish first, second, or third) in the last race is a profitable bet, even despite the track s take.
The end-of-the-day effect is consistent with using zero daily pro fit as a reference point and gambling in t he do main of loss es t o br eak even. Expec ted ut ility theo ry cannot grac efully explain the shift in risk preferences across the day if bettors integrate their wealth because the last race on Satu rday is not fundamentally different than t he first race on the bet tor s next o uting. Cumulative prospect theory can explain the shift by assuming people open a mental account at the beginning of the day, close it at the end, and hate closing an account in the red.
State lotteries
Lotto is a special kind of lottery game in which players choose six different numbers from a set of 40-50 numbers. They win a large jackpot if their six choice match six numbers which are randomly drawn in public. If no player picks all six numbers correctly, the jackpot is rolled 3 A similar bet, t he pick six , was introduced at hor se racing tracks in the 1980s. In the pick six, bettors must choose the winners of six races. This is extremely hard to do so a large rollover occurs if no bod y has p icked all six winne rs sever al days in a r ow, jus t like Lo tt o. Pick six betting now accounts for a large fraction of overall betting. 8 over and added to the next week s jackpot; several weeks of rollovers can build up jackpots up to $50 million or more. The large jackpots have made Lotto very popular.
3 Lotto was introduced in several American stat es in 1980, and account ed for about half of all stat e lott ery ticket sales by 1989. Cook and Clotfelter (1993) suggest that the popularity of Lotto is due to the fact that players are more sensitive to the large jackpot than to the correspondingly low probability of winning. They write (p. 634):
If players t end to judge the likelihood o f winning based on the frequency with which someone wins, then a larger state can offer a game at longer odds but with the same perceived probability of winning as a smaller state. The larger population base in effect conceals t he smaller proba bility of w inning the jack pot, while the larger jack pot is highly visible . This int erp ret ation is co ngr uent with prospec t t heo ry.
Their regressions show that across states, ticket sales are strongly correlated with the size of a state s population (which is correlated with jackpot size). Within a state, ticket sales each week are strongly correlated with the size of the rollover. In expect ed utility, this can o nly be explained by utility functions for money which ar e convex. Pro spect theory easily explains the demand for high jackpots, as Cook and Clotfelter suggest, by overweighting of, and insensitivity toward, very low probabilities.
10. Telephone wire repair insurance Ciccheti and Dubin (1994) conducted an interesting study of whether people purchase insurance against damage to their telephone wiring. The phone companies they studied either require customers to pay for the cost of wiring repair, about $60, or buy insurance for $.45 per month. Given phone company estimates of the frequency of wire damage, the expected cost of wire damage is only $.26.
Ciccheti and Dubin looked across geographical areas with different probabilities of wire damage rates, to see whet her variation in the tendency to buy insurance was related t o different probabilities. They did find a relation, and exploited this to estimate parameters of an expected utility model. They found some evidence that people were weighting damage probabilities nonlinearly, and also some evidence of status quo bias. (People who had previously been uninsured, when a new insurance option was introduced, were less likely to buy it than new customers were.)
More importantly, Ciccheti and Dubin never asked whether it is reasonable to purchase insurance against such a tiny risk. In standard expected utility, a person who is averse to very modest risks at all levels of wealth should be more risk-averse to large risks. Rabin (1998b) was the first to demonstrate how dramatic the implications of local risk-aversion are for global riskaver sion. He showed formally that a mildly risk-aver se expec ted-u tilit y maximizer who would turn down a coin flip (at all wealth levels) in which she is equally likely to win $101 or lose $100 should not accept a coin flip in which she could lose $10,000, reg ard less o f how much s he co uld win. In expect ed u tilit y ter ms, t urning do wn t he small-st akes flip implies a lit tle bit o f cur vat ure in a $201 range of a concave utility function. Turning it down for all wealth levels implies the utility function is slightly curved at all wealth levels, which implies a dramatic degree of global curvature.
Rabin s proof implies a rejection of the joint hypotheses that consumers why buy wirerepair insurance are integrating their wealth and valuing the insurance according to expected utility (and k now the correct pro babilit ies o f damage) . A mo re p lausible explana tio n co me immediately from prospect theory--consumers are overweighting the probability of damage. (Loss-aversion and reflection cannot explain their purchases because if they are loss-averse they should dislike spending the $.45 per month, and reflection implies they will never insure unless they overestimate the probability of loss.) Once again, narrow bracketing is also required--consumer s must be foc using o nly on wir e-r epair risk, since o therwise the tiny pr obability of a modest loss would be absorbed into a portfolio of life s ups and downs and weighted more rea sonably.
Conclusion
Economists value (i) mathematical for malism and econo metric parsimony, and (ii) the ability of theory to explain naturally-occurring data. (I share these tastes.) This paper showed that prospect theory is valuable in both ways because it can explain 10 patterns observed in a wide variety of economic domains with a small number of modelling features. Different features of prospect theory help explain different patterns. Loss-aversion can explain the extra return on stocks compared to bonds (the equity premium), the tendency of cab drivers to work longer hours on low-wage days, asymmetries in consumer react ions to price increases and decreases, the insensitivity of consumption to bad new about income, and status quo and endowment effects. Reflection effects--gambling in the domain of a perceived loss--can explain holding losing stocks longer than winner s (dispo sition effect s), insensitivity of consumption to bad income news, and the shift toward longshot betting at the end of a racetrack day. Nonlinear weighting of probabilities can explain the favorite-longshot bias in horse race betting, the popularity of Lotto lott eries with large jackpot s, and t he purchase of t elephone wire repair insurance. I n additio n, the disposition effect and downward-sloping labor supply of cab drivers were not simply observed, but were also predicted in advance, based on prospect theory.
In virtually all these examples it is also necessary to assume people are isolating or narrowly bracketing the relevant decisions. Bracketing narrowly focuses attention most dramatically on the possibility of a loss or extreme outcome, or a low probability. With broader bracketing, outcomes are mingled with other gains and losses, diluting the psychological influence of any single outcome and making these phenomena hard to explain as a result of prospect theory valuation.
I have two final comments. First, I have chosen examples in which there are several studies, or at least one very conclusive o ne, showing regu larities in field dat a which canno t be easily reconciled with expected utility theory. These regularit ies can sometimes be explained by adding extra assumptions. The problem is that these extras are truly ad hoc because each reg ular ity requ ires a special extra a ssumption. Wor se, an extra assumptio n which helps exp lain one regularity may contradict another. For example, assuming people are risk-preferring (i.e., have convex utility for money) can explain the popularity of longshot horses and Lotto, but that assumpt ion predicts st ocks should retur n less tha n bonds, which is wildly false. You can explain why cab drivers drive long hours on bad days by assuming they cannot borrow (they are liquidity-constrained ), but liquidity-constraint implies teachers who get good income news should no t be able t o sp end mo re, while t hose who get bad news can c ut back , which is exact ly the opposite of what they do.
Second, prospect theory is a suitable replacement for expected utility because it can anomalies like those listed above, and can also explain the most basic phenomena expected utility is used t o explain. A prominent example is pricing of financial asset s, discussed abo ve in sectio ns 1-2. Another prominent example, which appears in every economics textbook, is the voluntary pur chas e of insur ance by peo ple. The expe cted u tilit y expla nat ion fo r why peo ple bu y act uar ially unfair insurance is that they have concave utility, so they hate losing large amounts of money disproportionally, compared to spending small amounts on insurance premia.
In fact, many people do not purchase insurance voluntarily (e.g., most states require automobile insurance by law). The failure to purchase is inconsistent with the expected utility expla nat ion, and mo re e asy t o reco ncile w ith p rospect the ory (bec ause the dis utility of loss is assumed to be convex). When people do buy insurance, people are probably avoiding lowprobability disasters which they overweight (the prospect theory explanation), rather than avoiding a steep drop in a concave utility function (the expected utility theory explanation).
A crucial kind of evidence which distinguishes the two explanations comes from experiments on probabilistic insurance --insurance which does not pay a claim, if an accident occur s, w ith some p robabilit y r. Acco rding to expec ted ut ility theo ry, if r is small p eople shou ld pay approximately (1-r) times as much for probabilistic insurance as they pay for full insurance (Wakker, Thaler, and Tversky, 1997) . But experimental responses show that people hate probabilistic insurance; they pay a multiple much less than 1-r for it (for example, they pay 80% as much when r=.01). Prospect theory can explain their hatred easily--probabilistic insurance does not red uce the pro babilit y of lo ss all t he wa y to war d zero, and the low pr oba bility r is st ill overweighted. Prospect theory can therefore explain why people buy full insurance, and why they do not buy probabilistic insurance. Expected utility cannot do both.
Since prospect theory can explain some of the basic phenomena expected utility was most fruitfully applied to, like asset pricing and insurance purchase, and can also explain field anomalies like the 10 listed in Table 1 (two of which were predict ed), there is no go od scientific reaso n why it should no t replace expec ted ut ility in curr ent resear ch, and be give n prominent space in economics textbooks. 
